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Abstract
Forecasting the Extreme Right vote in French elections is one of the few ‘third-party’ forecasts which
has attracted attention in a forecasting literature focusing generally on incumbent performance and
winners. Despite being a ‘hard case’ due to third-party status, unstable polling estimates and
relatively few datapoints, previous models have provided relatively strong forecasts of the
performance of the Front national and its erstwhile leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The recent succession
of Le Pen by his daughter, Marine, and her apparent popularity pose a significant challenge to these
models, however. In this paper, we consider our previous model’s prediction of her likely score in
the first round of the presidentials, comparing this to standard forecasting benchmarks, and look at
possible adjustments to account for the speculated ‘Marine effect’. We then compare this with
other vote indicators including the results of an experimental expert judgment survey, finding that
there is currently little evidence for a likely runaway success for the new FN leader in April 2012.
1. Introduction
French forecasting remains one of the few country-cases outside the United States which attracts a
significant amount of attention. Whilst the focus is generally upon predicting winning candidates in
presidential races, and to a lesser extent, the majority winner in the legislative elections, France also
offers an excellent opportunity to forecast third-party outcomes, and in particular that of the
Extreme Right Front National and its presidential candidate. The 2012 elections are of particular
interest in this respect. Firstly, the previously immutable combination of “Jean-Marie Le Pen in the
presidentials, FN in the legislatives” has finally seen a change, with his daughter Marine Le Pen
taking over the présidentiable mantle. As we discuss later, this does pose a challenge to forecasting
the Extreme Right vote in the presidential race, not least because the personality effect is held to be
important both for Extreme Right party success and, self-evidently, for presidential candidates.
Secondly, there is a clear context emerging of possible success for Marine Le Pen in the presidential
race, certainly not in terms of attaining the presidency, but undoubtedly in exploiting the pouvoir de
nuisance on the right, to win back a number of disenchanted hard right voters who moved to Nicolas
Sarkozy and the UMP in 2007, as well as using the more ‘approachable’ profile of Le Pen fille to make
inroads into previously unreachable groups, including women and younger voters. A marked bonus
in popularity rating over her father indicates a potential for Marine Le Pen in terms of prospective
vote that a forecast model might do well to anticipate. However, as we discuss, at some five months
from the election, her popularity rating is the only key indicator which points towards any major
increase in performance above Jean-Marie Le Pen’s own success in 2002 1. To what extent should we
factor this in to any indicative – as opposed to robustly modelled – prediction? Thirdly, this provides
1 Voting intention indicators averaged 16.9 per cent in mid-December 2011, very similar to her father’s
performance in 2002, but short of the combined 19.2 per cent scored by Le Pen and Bruno Mégret.
the first opportunity for the authors precisely to retest their forecast model for the Extreme Right in
the French case in a true ex ante setting
In this paper, we suggest a ‘two-step’ approach which takes inspiration from previous attempts to
move away from some of the constraints imposed on traditional single-equation forecasting models
(e.g. Nadeau et al, 2010). We look to provide a baseline ex ante forecast of Marine Le Pen’s first-
round vote from our model, and then to consider an adjustment procedure that will allow us to
account for the change of candidate since the model was last tested. We begin by setting out the
logic of forecasting ‘hard cases’, which informs the first-order model underpinning our forecast. We
then look at deriving a second-order election forecast model, to allow us to estimate an observed
Marine Le Pen effect in the 2011 cantonal elections, and amend the baseline first-order forecast
accordingly. We subsequently consider three other indicators of likely electoral performance –
voting intention, popularity polls, and an experimental expert estimate benchmark – to compare
with the adjusted baseline model forecast. Lastly, we consider possible shocks between now and the
actual election which might raise its error. We conclude that, whilst the decline of the FN in the late
2000s has evidently abated, Marine Le Pen’s performance in April 2012 is unlikely to see her soar
above the bar set by her father a decade ago.
2. Forecasting hard cases: the ‘shock’ of new leadership
Forecasting models have become widespread in the voting literature, both in ex post and quasi ex
ante format. True ex ante models are less widespread due to publishing deadlines and reticence
amongst political scientists about ‘putting their money where their mouth is’. Also less common are
forecast models which aim to forecast outcomes other than the winner of an election, and their
margin of victory. As we review in one such endeavour elsewhere (Evans and Ivaldi, forthcoming),
focus is inevitably drawn to the principal outcome of interest in most if not all elections. However,
this does not mean that forecasting other outputs from an election, including smaller ‘third-party’
vote shares, has no academic value (see for instance Bélanger et al, 2010). On the contrary,
forecasting who else does how well puts explanatory models of behaviour in the spotlight, and
identifies what really matters in these models.
Such a logic could in principle be brought to bear on any political party. Empirically, a lack of
datapoints across time generally means that the majority of non-mainstream parties are subject to
model instability which rules out a standard forecasting approach, assuming that this is of
conceptual interest. However, of all third parties in European democracies which raise interest in
predicting how they will do in elections, parties of the far right stand out.2 Despite their forty-year
history in the post-war period, they still retain a (morbid) fascination for many commentators. This
long history is useful for the forecaster in that it provides more than a small handful of datapoints to
support the modelling process. In this regard, the French FN is most amenable to modelling, given its
(almost) uninterrupted electoral presence since 1974.
2 We are of course aware that in a number of cases, these third parties have in fact joined coalition
governments, or polled amongst the highest vote shares – for example, the Austrian FPÖ and the Norwegian
FrP.
No doubt taking the lead from US literature on the two-party system, much of the forecasting work
on France has traditionally adopted a two-bloc approach, with the FN being included as part of the
Right bloc (e.g. Jérôme et al, 1999; Auberger and Dubois, 20053). Other approaches include more
advanced multiparty forecasts of all major party groupings within the French party system
(Arzheimer and Evans, 2010). Attempts at forecasting the FN score are few, but increasing in number
(Jérôme and Jérôme-Speziari, 2003, 2004; Auberger, 2007; Evans and Ivaldi, 2008; for a comparative
forecast of Extreme Right parties, see also Evans and Ivaldi, 2010). These various approaches to
modelling the FN and its presidential candidate’s score have revealed a remarkable accuracy in
forecast, despite many analyses of Extreme Right parties pointing out their problematic nature in
terms of definition, ideological profile and varying pools of support. In fact, whether at national or
regional level, a small number of predictors perform well and bypass the complexities set out by
many rich explanatory theories of Extreme Right support (e.g. Lubbers et al, 2002; .Ivarsflaten,
2005).
The 2012 race throws a new obstacle in our way. After nearly forty years of leading the FN, Jean-
Marie Le Pen has retired, to make way for his daughter Marine. Leadership successions inevitably
focus attention on the likely value-added or -subtracted that the new chef attracts, but specifically
for forecast models, the change of leader introduces a shock which one must assume may affect the
stability of the previous model. This is all the more true of an Extreme Right party for whom the
personality effect of a charismatic candidate is held to be fundamental to the party’s chances
(Pedazhur and Brichta 2002).4 The Le Pen effect has been well documented in previous analyses of
FN support (Perrineau, 1998; Mayer, 2002) but had largely been perceived to have diminished
subsequent to the presidential second-round of 2002. The accession of Marine Le Pen to the FN
presidency has incontestably inaugurated a new political era for the French extreme right. All
available indicators point to the political dynamics initiated by the new party leadership, and to
brighter prospects for what is anticipated by many observers to be a ‘Marine blue wave’ in the 2012
presidential election.
Certainly the second-order elections held since her assumption of the FN’s presidency indicate an
electoral revival. After navigating shallower electoral waters between 2007 and 2009, the party
regained strength in the 2010 regional and 2011 cantonal elections by polling 11.4 and 15.1 per cent
of the national vote respectively. In March 2011, the success of the FN in the cantonal ballot was
largely attributed to the rejuvenating ‘Marine’ personality effect. This new political ‘franchise’
dominated the party’s campaign strategy and eventually allowed patently inexperienced local
candidates to achieve record scores across the country, up to an average of 19.2 per cent in the
cantons where the FN was standing 5. A quick glance at popularity data curves shows that Marine Le
3 Auberger and Dubois control for separate FN effect on Right-wing seats won using a control variable for
triangulaires in their model.
4 See, however, van der Brug and Mughan (2007) who find a diminished role for the ‘charismatic leader’
argument.
5 Some caution should be exercised in comparing the 2011 performance with the electoral showings of the FN
in previous cantonal ballots. First, it must be noted that the FN only ran candidates in about 74 per cent of all
renewable cantons, as opposed to over 90 per cent in the past. In 2011, these were not randomly selected but
rather ‘safe bet’ cantons where the party had polled its best scores in 2007. Secondly, the high level of
Pen has been consistently enjoying higher levels of popular support compared to her father, with
difference ratios of 1.6 (SOFRES), 1.4 (IFOP) and 1.2 (IPSOS) (see Figure 1 below). Her personal
popularity has reached historic highs since her taking over the party in January 2011, and is also
consistently above that of her party (with an average difference of 5.8 points in the TNS-SOFRES
political barometer over the 2010/11 period of time).
Figure 1 about here
This surge in popularity is corroborated by the exceptionally high level of support that the new FN
leader has gained in earlier voting intentions polls. In March 2011, a number of polls brought back
memories of 21st April 2002, finding that the FN candidate could lead in the first round of the 2012
presidential election with up to 24 per cent of the vote. In sharp contrast, let us recall that the
highest polling score ever recorded for Jean-Marie Le Pen ahead of the 2002 ‘earthquake’ was only
14 per cent. We return to current polling scores later.
Such an effect is clearly the product of the strategic move towards the modernization of the FN. The
search for credibility and ‘normalization’ – in the party’s own words ‘dédiabolisation’ – was initiated
in the 2007 presidential election after Marine Le Pen was appointed campaign director, and was
further accentuated after she took over the party in 2011. The new FN leadership has since striven
to present a more respectable face for the party by breaking away from some of the more
controversial positions taken by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the past, as well as his often inflammatory,
demagogic style. This evolution in the public image of the party has been complemented by some
important changes in its policy positions under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. The new economic
manifesto of the FN is marked by a distinct shift to the left, towards a more statist – quasi Colbertist
– approach to social protectionism embedded in the more general anti-globalization doctrine that
had already emerged in the 2002 presidential platform. Together with slightly more nuanced
positions on some cultural issues – most notably abortion – these changes seem likely to alter the
sociological basis of the FN by broadening its appeal to a wider constituency beyond the traditional
boundaries of its petty-bourgeois and working class electorate, and building on the public perception
of the new party leader as more ‘moderate’ and politically acceptable. Already polling data reveal
that Marine Le Pen could be in a position to attract social groups that have been traditionally more
averse to supporting the extreme right, particularly young voters, women or the lower strata within
the middle-class electorate.
Lastly, some of the alterations that will take place in the pattern of party competition in the 2012
presidential election might further account for a boost in popular support for the FN. In particular,
the changing status of Nicolas Sarkozy from candidate of rupture and uncontested leader of the ‘self-
confident’ right to that of highly unpopular incumbent could fuel voters’ resentment and bolster the
FN vote. That a number of former UMP supporters might defect to the extreme right in the
forthcoming presidential ballot is evidenced by opinion polls showing possible shifts of about 15-
abstention in the 2011 cantonals (55 per cent compared with about 30-35 per cent previously) might have
artificially inflated the FN score.
20 per cent of those who voted for Sarkozy in 2007. The magnitude of the electoral transfers to take
place in 2012 will depend on the incumbent president’s ability to salvage credibility as a national
leader and the UMP’s capacity to sustain its hard line on immigration and crime, while both need to
disparage FN credibility in dealing effectively with the debt crisis and all related economic issues.
Unfortunately, the ‘Marine effect’ cannot easily be introduced into a structural model with no
previous cases. We first need to run our baseline model to look at what it predicts the presidential
candidate’s performance to be. Then, we need to model the one election where Marine Le Pen was
in charge – the cantonal elections of 2011 – to estimate what change occurred in outcome from
previous second-order elections that can be attributed to the leader, and adjust our baseline model
accordingly. To this end, this paper adopts a ‘two-step’ approach which combines two different sets
of forecasts, with one baseline equation for all first-order elections since 1974 and another
adjustment model derived from all second-order ballots since 1984. In the following section, we
focus on the structural baseline first-order model itself.
3. A baseline structural model of the Le Pen vote in first-order elections
Based on our previous comparative work on predicting the radical right vote in Europe, the 2012 FN
presidential forecast in this paper is derived from a macro structural model that was successfully
tested in comparative context with Austria, Denmark and France, and specifically for all first-order
elections in France over the 1974-2007 period (Evans and Ivaldi, 2010). This baseline model
combines three relevant dimensions – economic, cultural and political – which are central to the
understanding of the electoral dynamics of the FN. This application of our comparative model to the
French case represented a significant improvement on our previous attempt to forecast the FN vote
in all nationwide elections – including regional and European ballots – using short-term popularity
data (Evans & Ivaldi, 2008).
An important premise of the model stems from the original proposition by Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) that the electoral success of the new radical right should be understood in a two-dimensional
space for political competition. In their view, a new libertarian-authoritarian ‘cultural’ cleavage
crosscut the traditional economic (left-right) axis, with radical right parties standing in the right-
authoritarian quadrant. These two dimensions are operationalized by looking at the key issues of
immigration and unemployment. Together with crime, these have been identified as the bedrock of
electoral support for the FN in France since the mid-1980s (Perrineau, 1998; Mayer, 2002), and still
form the core of the programmatic appeal by the party in the 2012 presidential ballot.
Secondly, the model controls for the type of electoral race to account for the differentiation that
exists in the FN between the party and its leader. Since the mid-1980s, this personality effect has
translated into a significant increase in the vote for Le Pen in presidential elections compared with
the performances of his party elsewhere. This can be linked with the general argument on the role of
charismatic leaders in the political success of radical right parties in Europe. It also relates to the
populist dimension underpinning their electoral appeal (Betz,1994; Mudde 2007). Radical right
parties fuel public resentment towards the political elite and in return mobilize voters dissatisfied
with politics. In the French context, Le Pen’s strong leadership has attracted protest voters from
outside the core ideological support for the party, most dramatically in presidential elections where
candidate-centred considerations are paramount.
The baseline model is a simple linear regression predicting ex post the national percentage of valid
vote for the FN in all first-order elections (presidential and legislative) between 1974 and 2007
(n=13). Our dependent variable is the individual FN score. We ignore a number of small splinter
and/or competing parties on the extreme right such as the PFN in the later 1970s or, more recently,
Mégret’s MNR, Lang’s PDF or the Bloc Identitaire/Ligue du Sud, which have never achieved electoral
relevance at national level.
We employ three variables which are relevant to the examination of the economic, cultural and
political factors discussed above. Firstly, economic conditions are tapped by looking at the
unemployment rate 6 months in advance of the election 6. Secondly, for the cultural dimension, we
look at immigration and measure the change in the total numbers of immigrants legally admitted
into France in the year immediately preceding the election 7. This not only provides information
about immigration flows, but can also be regarded as an appropriate proxy for the ‘restrictiveness’
of governments’ immigration policies over time. Finally, to operationalize the political dimension, an
‘election type’ dummy variable is used, with presidential ballots coded 1.
Parameter estimates for the OLS regression are presented in Table 1, together with robust standard
errors 8. As can be seen, the model works very well with a mean absolute error (MAE) of only 1.34
over the 1974-2007 period. 9 The direction of effect for the individual parameters corresponds to the
theoretical expectation, with electoral support for the FN growing with unemployment and
immigration10. The model confirms Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) view of the FN as the ideal-type of
6 Standardised seasonally adjusted figures for unemployment rates are expressed as a percentage of the
civilian labour force according to the common criteria in ILO definition. Since November 2007, these are
compiled quarterly from the results of the INSEE Employment Survey. Their definition differs from that used in
the monthly unemployment statistics published by DARES (Ministry of Labour). At the time of writing, official
figures show unemployment levels rising in the third quarter of 2011 at 9.8 per cent. However, the latest
national statistics published in early December show signs of further deterioration in the labour market in
October. Therefore, assuming the psychological impact from media coverage of unemployment, we use the
European commission forecast of a 10 per cent rate in 2012, which, in our opinion, better reflects the current
aggravation (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2011_autumn/fr_en.pdf).
7 Immigration figures were compiled from a number of national and international sources including the OECD,
OIM, the French OFPRA, DPM and Ministry of Interior for the post-2002 data. These exclude all short-term
temporary stays by foreigners, students, as well of course as undocumented migrants. Since 2007, some
changes have been introduced in the methods employed to collect immigration data from various sources.
There are discrepancies between the official statistics published for instance by the Ministry of Interior’s
(formerly Ministry of Immigration and National Identity) SGII-DSED division, and those published by the Office
Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (OFII).
8 We use Huber–White sandwich estimators to correct for heteroskedasticity.
9 The mean absolute error (MAE) gives the mean error from the out-of-sample forecasts, i.e. how well each
election case is predicted by the other cases in the set.
10 No evidence of strong cross-correlation between predictors was found, with variance inflation factors (VIF)
close to 1 in all three predictors.
the new radical right in Europe, drawing upon both unemployment and immigration issues for
electoral support. Equally, an apparent ‘presidential boost’ can be established from the data, with
stronger performances for Le Pen in presidential ballots –roughly a 4.5 per cent bonus above his
party’s support in legislative elections.
Table 1 about here
As a linear forecast model based upon socio-economic indicators, there is one important implication
of the model. The party’s vote increases in line with a degradation of employment and increase in
immigration. To date, unemployment change remains relatively bounded in its annual changes.
Moreover, it is unlikely that any government of whatever political flavour will open France’s borders
to mass immigration. Consequently, the model implies some kind of ‘ceiling’ effect to the FN’s
support. Conversely, were FN support to increase substantially, this implies that the model is badly
specified, either in terms of function – the relationship is not linear, for instance – or in terms of
being wrongly or under-specified – other factors matter, or may come to matter more.
We return to under-specification, and the possibility of Marine Le Pen ‘effect’ above and beyond
that manifested in the baseline model, shortly. Firstly, how to assess the strength of the forecast
model so far? In single-country forecasts, model quality can be assessed across four main
components: reproducibility, lead time, parsimony and, ultimately, accuracy (Lewis-Beck 1985).
Empirically, the data used in the model allow for its replication over time, although there might be
some minor concern with changes that occur in the collection of immigration statistics by official
bodies in the future, thereby lowering reproducibility. Secondly, the lags used for the independent
variables in the model make it possible to issue a forecast a few months ahead of the election. In
this, our model enjoys a substantial advantage in lead time over predictions based on short-term
polling data –e.g. incumbent and/or opposition popularity. With only three predictors and a healthy
error term, our model equally seems to fit the bill for parsimony. A more systematic evaluation can
be conducted with goodness-of-fit diagnostic measures such as the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and its variants. With just three variables included, however, these measures vary in line with
forecast error, improving with the inclusion of each predictor.11
Finally, Table 2 addresses accuracy.
Table 2 about here
Overall, the model provides excellent ex post forecasts of FN performance in first-order elections.
Since 1981, out-of-sample error has never risen above 2 per cent, and only above 1.5 per cent on
two occasions – the 2002 presidentials, where Jean-Marie Le Pen outperformed almost every poll
11 A full set of goodness-of-fit measures are available from the authors.
and forecast; and the 2007 legislatives, where his relatively poor showing in the presidentials
hamstrung his party one month later. As a stable forecast model, then, the model performs well.
Nevertheless, we can use other means of evaluating the accuracy of our forecasting model relative
to other benchmarks. The low absolute error is indicative of a strong model. However, with even a
parsimonious model, it is worthwhile comparing this with standard benchmarks to check that the
inclusion of exogenous predictors provide sufficient value-added to be worthwhile. Overall, the
latter outperforms random models constructed using past performances either at t-1 (walk) or
averaging all preceding electoral ballots (mean). Such naïve endogenous models would fail to
accurately predict the variation in the support for the FN across the whole period (MAEs of 4.56 and
4.47 respectively). Similarly, our model can be contrasted with trial-heat polls that are conducted
prior to the election (Campbell 1996; Pickup and Johnston 2008). Comparing the model’s ex-post
adjusted predicted values (out-of-sample) with the average of voting intention polls released for the
2002 and 2007 presidential elections showed that the model estimates were closer to the actual
election outcome on both occasions (Evans and Ivaldi, 2010: 91-2).
Based upon the model’s parameters and the unemployment and immigration data available, we can
derive ex ante forecasts for the 2012 presidential and subsequent legislative elections. It is worth
noting that the structural building of the model should in theory render possible to issue forecasts
four months in advance of the electoral races, taken into account delays that occur before
government statistics are made available to the public independent from the final shape of the
political competition that will take place on both occasions, with the risk of course of overlooking
possible late-campaign effects. At the time of writing, an additional limitation is imposed by the fact
that neither the 2011 nor 2010 immigration data have yet been released by the Ministry12, which
forces us to use as sole reliable data the 2010 figures presented in the latest Annual Activity report
by OFII. This absence of official immigration statistics for the year preceding the election limits our
ability to produce a true unconditional forecast for 2012. It will also inevitably affect the accuracy of
the forecasts, recalling that a 10 per cent change in immigration yields a 1.2 per cent increase in the
anticipated FN / Le Pen vote according to the model. This said, a glance at inflows of foreigners since
2003 shows no discernible trend and, more importantly, little variation in numbers of immigrants
admitted into France from one year to the next, within a -9.8 / +8.8 per cent range. Moreover, the
recent passing of the Bill on “Immigration, Integration and Nationality” (Law 2011-672) was
testimony to the government’s commitment to the continuation of hard-line restrictive immigration
policies. Whilst the final 2011 figure will inevitably differ somewhat from that employed here, we
can therefore be reasonably optimistic in assuming that the observed discrepancy will remain of
limited amplitude.
With an unemployment rate of 10 per cent and a percentage change of 6.8 per cent in recorded
entries of legal immigrants in France during 2010, under a ‘same leader’ hypothesis, our baseline
12 Clearly, immigration statistics increasingly become extremely sensitive politicized issues. In March 2011,
Marine Le Pen has for instance presented ‘leaked’ figures identifying, she claimed, an increase of more than 42
per cent in the immigration rate in 2011 (http://www.lepoint.fr/fil-info-reuters/marine-le-pen-brandit-ses-
chiffres-de-l-immigration-12-03-2011-1305666_240.php). Were this indeed the case, the immigration
parameter in the model would give her some 4 per cent more than the official 2010 figure of 6.8% that we
used here.
first-order model predicts that the FN candidate will poll 15.2 per cent of the valid vote in the first
round of the presidential.
Whatever the internal validity of the model, there is no escaping the fact that our model provides a
very conservative estimate of Marine Le Pen’s likely performance, given many of the qualitative and
albeit speculative commentaries on her performance as party leader, and the suggestive polling
data. A good forecast model should stand on its own terms and, if robust, be more convincing than
intuitive accounts of likely performance. Equally, however, the model is badly specified inasmuch as
it does not control for a change of leader. We therefore feel it is entirely appropriate to look to
adjust the model estimate on the basis of additional information, as well as comparing any
adjustment with other potential forecasts.
4. An adjustment model for second-order elections: finding the ‘Marine effect’
To estimate the possible effect of Marine Le Pen as national party leader or presidential candidate,
we cannot conjure up cases for our model which have not yet occurred. The only election at which
she has actually led the party is the cantonal election of March 2011. Inasmuch as this provides our
only empirical case, one approach is to try to model second-order elections, to see how out of line a
prediction of these 2011 elections is compared with an otherwise well-specified model which
predicts party performance under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership.
Such a second-order model is relatively easily derived. Unlike the first-order model, we base this
model upon the core popularity model (Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2010). Given our concern is to find an
ex post indicator of the effect of Marine Le Pen’s own vote premium, we are not concerned by issues
of lead-time or explanatory independence. Instead, we exploit the relative stability of sub-national
election performance by building in an endogenous predictor, i.e. FN vote at the previous election of
the same type, as well as what would in a ‘pure’ forecast model be regarded as a trivial popularity
estimator, namely the last poll prior to the sub-national elections (normally two to three weeks
before). Given the importance of timing of sub-national elections in the electoral cycle (Schmitt,
2005) and their consequent shifting role as protest elections – clearly important in the FN case – we
include a third predictor, namely the percentage of time elapsed within the first-order election
cycle 13. Lastly, we include simple dummy controls for regional and European elections, to control for
election type effects. Overall, rather than looking at causally relevant socio-economic variables as
predictors, we are simply looking to pick up as much aggregate variance across a variety of contexts
in sub-national units as possible.
As Table 3 shows, the second-order model is accurate and not entirely unparsimonious (k=5, n=19).
Moreover, even though we are interested in the model simply in terms of predictive fit, all
13 On average the 19 second-order elections considered for the analysis took place near mid-term (41.5 per
cent of the national election cycle elapsed) when government popularity usually reaches a nadir. As would be
anticipated, a negative correlation was also found between the temporal location of the second-order election
and Prime Ministerial popularity as measured in the TNS-SOFRES series since the late 1970s (r =-0.56 p=0.006
n=19).
parameters make sense in explanatory terms, being in the right direction and fitting a general
‘protest vote’ model.
Tables 3 and 4 about here
Looking at the predicted scores (Table 4), the model performs quite well from 1998 onwards 14. The
model would have accurately forecast the low-tide FN score in the cantonal ballot of 2001 following
the MNR split of 1999, as well as that of 2008 ballot subsequent to the disastrous showing of the
party in the 2007 national elections. Interestingly, the model would have still overestimated the
2004 cantonals at a time when the ‘Sarkozy effect’ was apparently beginning to progressively attract
voters away from the extreme right. In contrast, the extreme right performance in the recent 2011
cantonal ballot would have been underestimated, precisely the model’s worst forecast since the late
1990s. Assuming the model tells us what should have happened had Jean-Marie Le Pen still been in
charge in 2011, other things being equal, it is likely then that the FN received a small electoral boost
from its new leader. From the out-of-sample error, the size of this ‘leadership premium’ can be
estimated at about 2.2 per cent, corresponding to the error that would have occurred in predicting
the 2011 score on the basis of all previous second-order elections since the mid-1980s under the
‘same leader’ hypothesis.
In passing, we would also note the important explanatory (rather than predictive) finding that the
observed variance in the FN electoral performances shows the dissimilar political opportunity
structures that exist between first- and second-order elections in France. This is true for instance of
changes that take place in the European election party system, with single-issue parties temporarily
entering the European electoral arena. The negative sign of the ‘European election’ dummy variable
in the model points to a deterioration of the FN score in European ballots, which in part can be
regarded as a result of the competition with other Eurosceptic actors on the right of the political
spectrum (e.g. Pasqua’s RPF or De Villiers’ MPF). Similarly, the analysis of model performances
should take into account changes in the organizational structure of the party, more specifically the
splits between rival factions that have been historically endemic within the French Extreme Right. As
can be seen from Table 4, the model would have indeed accurately anticipated the drop in electoral
support for the FN which occurred in the 1999 European and 2001 cantonal elections as a
consequence of the forming of rival MNR by Bruno Mégret. Since the latter’s ‘retirement’ from
14 It should be noted that testing this model on the first-order elections provided woefully inaccurate forecasts
– worse than running the first order model on the second-order elections. Both of these trials are available
from the authors on request.
politics in 2008, the Extreme Right vote has returned to the quasi-exclusivity of the FN, with only
minor challengers such as the Bloc Identitaire (BI) or the Parti de la France (PDF). Beside the
personality effect, some of Marine Le Pen’s bonus could well be due to her capacity to bring in MNR
voters from the cold 15.
Of course, in adjusting our first-order model on the basis of this second-order test, there is one large
assumption: that cantonal and presidential performance will be similar, even given the focus of the
latter on the individual. In a period when Marine Le Pen’s leadership ‘honeymoon’ seems to be over,
and where her polling scores are some 6-7 per cent lower than at the time of the cantonals, we feel
that a conservative estimate towards parity between the two admittedly very different elections is
reasonable. If we were to adjust our first-order forecast of Marine Le Pen’s performance in April
2012 on the basis of this these data, we would therefore estimate her score at 17.4 per cent.
5. Complementary forecasts of Le Pen vote in 2012
An additional way of assessing likely forecast accuracy is to compare the model prediction with that
of other forecast modes. Here we use three: voting intention; popularity ratings; and expert
judgement. The first two are standard indicators used by a range of commentators in advance of
elections to provide not just final predictions, but also indicators of the dynamics of the campaign.
The expert judgement indicator, whilst common in work looking in particular at policy positions of
political parties (e.g. Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Benoit and Laver, 2006; McElroy and Benoit, 2010),
is almost absent (to our knowledge) from the recent forecasting literature, although it was famously
tested relatively recently (Hofstee and Schaapman, 1990). We consider the three complementary
measures in turn.16
a) Voting intention
In the year that preceded her taking control of the party, Marine Le Pen received a relatively low
average of 12.5 per cent in the polls (n=18). The change in FN leadership has witnessed a dual
revival, both in Marine Le Pen’s own popularity scores and in the vote intentions in the presidential
race, peaking at some 24 per cent around the time of the cantonal elections of March 2011 (Harris, 6
March 2011). Figure 2 gives the spread of voting intentions by the main polling houses from January
15 Notably, the new top-level leadership that has emerged from the XIVth party congress in January 2011 has
accommodated a number of former mégrétistes such as Steeve Briois, Bruno Bilde and Nicolas Bay.
16 Our test is far less robust than Hofstee and Schaapman’s, lacking as it does, for instance, any control group.
However, we still feel it provides a useful expert benchmark.
2011 until the most recent polls. At first glance, there seems to be little pattern in the polls, other
than ‘house effects’ for each polling institute. A moving average fit to the data indicates a downward
trend after the cantonal elections of March 2011, followed by an upswing in early November 2011,
averaging 16.9 per cent across the most recent polls at the time of writing.17
Figure 2 about here
One important question to ask is the validity of vote intentions some five months before the election
– and we would answer ‘not very’. With regards in particular to the FN presidential performances of
the past, other causes of instability in forecasting Jean-Marie Le Pen’s vote were under-sampling, the
‘spiral of silence’, and polling institutes’ own attempts to correct their poll scores for this. We do not
know the extent to which these multiple sources of error still apply. The discrepancies in the current
range of scores found across major sources of vote intentions seem to indicate that pollsters are still
confronted with the necessity to derive their own ad hoc correcting factors. Yet there is a consensus
amongst institutes to acknowledge the fact that FN supporters are now keener to express their ‘true
preferences’ in surveys 18. If established, this normalization of the extreme right vote could lead to a
substantial improvement in the predictive accuracy of trial-heat polls in 2012 and beyond.
b) Popularity rating
As part of the VP-function literature and the so-called ‘referendum model’ using government
popularity as an indicator (Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2010), popularity measures in opinion polls provide
a useful indicator of a candidate or party’s standing with the general public prior to the election. In
the case of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the FN, historically, popularity scores have however proved poor
indicators of eventual vote in the first-order elections (Evans and Ivaldi, 2008: 142).
Figure 3 about here
Looking firstly at the IPSOS time-series popularity for the FN leader in 2002, 2007 and 2012, there is
no evidence of a clear trend in Jean-Marie Le Pen’s scores prior to the first two elections. In 2007, his
popularity was in fact higher during most of the 2007 campaign compared with what it was in 2002.
Moreover, in the last week before the election, he had the exact same score (22%), yet he polled
only 10.4% in 2007 as opposed to 16.9% five years earlier. Today, six months before the election,
Marine’s popularity is twice that of her father back in 2002 and about 10% higher than 2007. With
no comparable election to assess the popularity/vote ratio – even if one exists – it is of no help in
trying to derive a reasonable forecast.
17 Specifically: OpinionWay, 18 per cent (24/11/2011); SOFRES, 16;5 per cent (26/11/2011); IFOP, 19.5 per cent
(30/11/2011); BVA, 17 per cent (03/12/2011); IPSOS, 17 per cent (03/12/2011) and LH2, 13.5 per cent
(10/12/2011).
18 See ‘Les électeurs FN sont plus nombreux à assumer leur vote’ (Le Monde, 19 November 2011).
A similar conclusion would apply to the IFOP-Paris Match barometer: in March 2007, a few weeks
before the first-round of the presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen had a surge in popularity (+6)
with 31% of positive ratings (which was to persist into April 2007), one of his best scores since the
survey started in 2003. In November 2011, the comparable figure for Marine Le Pen is 30. Again, we
have no way of knowing how popularity will translate into vote.
Figure 4 about here
Finally, we can look more systematically at the ‘longue durée’ using the TNS-SOFRES series back to
the mid-1980s. Figure 4 uses all first-order elections since 1986 (n=13) to look at party and leader
popularity against actual vote. Again, the results are similar, with no evidence of any relationship
between the two, either for party or leader.
Overall, then, as with the voting intention figures, there is a wide disparity in popularity by polling
house. Unlike voting intention, or indeed our adjusted model and particularly second-order
elections, where precisely popularity data have shown a link with electoral performance, we lack an
empirically proven ‘equation’ to link current popularity scores to final vote. The most we can say
from this is that Marine Le Pen’s popularity is markedly higher than current expressed voting
intentions.
c) Expert judgement
Our final approach to estimating Marine Le Pen’s likely score in 2012 is to operationalise expert
academic knowledge into a predictive indicator. The value of expert surveys for election forecasts
has been examined in the context of American presidential elections (Jones et al, 2007; Graefe et al,
2011), but to date, to the best of our knowledge, no comparable experiment has been conducted in
France. Colloquially, experts should ‘know’ what the likely outcome of an election will be. It is
unlikely that any one expert can give an accurate forecast with any degree of certainty, but
averaging across a number of expert opinions should, other things being equal, give a useful forecast
of the likely outcome. In early November 2011, we contacted 100 experts on French electoral
politics or comparative radical right parties, and asked them to provide (anonymously) their own
estimate for Le Pen 19. We closed the poll on 16 November 2011 and achieved a final response rate
of over 50 per cent with a total of 56 participating experts. The results are given below (Table 5).
Table 5 about here
Firstly, the range of predictions is very large. Our expectation that experts would provide a clustered
set of forecasts was wide of the mark. Inevitably, there may be an element of wishful thinking /
pessimism introducing bias into the forecasts, resulting in a range of 20 per cent. But by taking the
19 Participating experts were asked the following question: “What is your own estimate, today, of Marine Le
Pen's score in the first round of the 2012 Presidential election?”.
mean position across a relatively healthy number of responses, we would produce an estimated
17.05 per cent for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 2012 presidential election, with an
interquartile range of 3 per cent. In terms of expert judgement, this suggests that some of the
highest voting intention polls are overly optimistic, but agrees almost exactly with that of our
adjusted structural model. Moreover, the significant minority of predictions above 20 per cent -
which would constitute an outstanding performance for the FN candidate – seem to suggest that the
popularity polls promise an as-yet untapped pool of electoral support which will ‘convert’ to vote
intention between now and April. However, the majority of responses fall within the 15-18 per cent
band, suggesting once again that the ‘Marine blue wave’ is perhaps a breaker, but not tidal.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Forecasting the 2012 Presidential election is principally about ‘who wins’. Other papers in this
special issue deal with this issue admirably. However, a close second to this topic is how well the
new Extreme Right presidential candidate will do. Given the narrative of Marine Le Pen’s ‘softer’,
more acceptable image and a political context of economic crisis, unpopular mainstream leaders and
generalised disenchantment, the received wisdom that she will outperform her father’s score of
2002 is in many ways compelling. However, as we have seen above, three of our four indicators
currently place her result well under the 19 per cent of the combined Extreme Right score in 2002,
and only just over Jean-Marie Le Pen’s score of the same year. Our adjusted structural model
predicts a performance of around 17 per cent, as does the expert judgement and the average voting
intention. Popularity polling places her much higher, and there is of course the possibility that this
represents a tappable pool of additional voters. However, liking a candidate, or finding them to have
a positive image, does not equate to voting for them. With a forecast literature which has identified
the six-month margin as the optimal lag for models (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992) we would expect to
see such popularity also manifest itself in a more overt vote indicator if this conversion were likely to
happen. To date, it has not consistently done so.
Conversely, we are of course only at five months’ distance from the election, whatever the forecast
literature states, and with a highly unstable economic situation which could make or break
candidates who need to offer policy solutions, as well as an incumbent who needs to provide
convincing executive action until the election itself. President Sarkozy’s management of the Cannes
G20 summit received relatively positive assessments, and certainly his own poll ratings and vote
intentions improved from what was a parlous situation only one month previously. Conversely, the
unveiling of changes to European treaties in order to settle the Eurozone crisis might revive the
Eurosceptic forces that had prevailed in 2005 ECT referendum in France, which could well benefit
the strong anti-Euro campaign led by the FN.
Another source of variation in the predictive accuracy of all current forecasts of Marine Le Pen’s
performance will be of course turnout. The cumulated experience of the two presidential ballots of
2002 and 2007 has shown that changes in the FN electoral support are likely to be amplified by
levels of popular abstention. In 2012, the FN candidate would probably benefit from the decision by
large numbers of dissatisfied former Sarkozy’s supporters of 2007 to express their discontent
through abstention. She would also benefit further from the immigration issue, should the eventual
release of the official figures, and the consequent amendment of the model to an unconditional, but
ex post, forecast version, prove to be higher than our included estimate. Our model has relied
throughout upon official figures, however, and thus it would be inappropriate to start factoring in
any public perceptions of immigration potentially influenced by Marine Le Pen’s statements about
immigration levels. We acknowledge that risk, nonetheless.
Given the primacy of presidential elections, particularly since the alignments of the presidential and
legislative electoral calendars and the imposition of the quinquennat, the actual outcome of the FN
candidate’s presidential first round is a sine qua non for predicting the legislative elections.
Experience shows that even strong first-round performances were not matched by the party itself in
subsequent legislatives – and poor first-round performances ravaged the FN’s scores. Whilst the
personality ‘bonus’ can be legitimately factored in for a presidential forecast, its strict applicability to
legislative elections is more debatable. As suggested earlier, the outcome of the cantonal elections
of March 2011 has helped establish the positive impact of the new ‘Marine franchise’ inside the
party, with local candidates clearly benefiting from the popularity of their newly elected leader. This
personalization process could therefore be expected to replicate in the June 2012 legislative race.
However, our working hypothesis here is that a likely disappointing showing by Marine Le Pen in the
first round of the presidential race –mostly her inability to disrupt the announced Hollande / Sarkozy
left-right swordfight – will result in the relative waning if not disappearing of her personality effect.
Based on the first-order model parameters, our unadjusted estimate of the FN score in the
legislative ballot of June 2012 is therefore 10.7 per cent.
Lastly, polls of second round intentions – where Marine Le Pen’s voters will go, assuming she does
not progress to the ballotage herself – indicated in December 2011 a close-to-equal split between
François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy of those who indicated they would vote at all.20 Le Pen
evidently enjoys support from both camps, in a manner reminiscent of the ‘winning formula’. At the
point of writing, however, there is a good deal of congruence between three key indicators. Our
model concurs with the empirical information – as opposed to informed speculation – which we can
currently access. Marine Le Pen will likely score 17.4 per cent of the valid vote in April 2012.
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TABLE AND FIGURES
Table 1 Baseline regression model of FN voting in first-order elections (1974-2007)(1)
B s.e. VIF
Constant -11.74 1.61
Presidential(2) 4.56 0.59 1.01
∆ Immigration 0.12 0.01 1.08
Unemployment 2.15 0.14 1.09
Adj. R2 0.95
1.35
1.34
13
SE
MAE
N
(1) as % of valid vote cast;
(2) Dummy variable: presidential=1 legislative=0.
Table 2 Individual FN vote prediction errors ( ˆ ) and out-of-sample errors
Year Type(1) ˆ Out-of-sample error
1974 P 0.17 0.43
1978 L 2.04 3.23
1981 L -2.08 -2.64
1986 L 1.05 1.30
1988 P -1.09 -1.44
1988 L -1.04 -1.22
1993 L 0.98 1.17
1995 P 0.34 0.72
1997 L 0.80 1.05
2002 P 0.87 1.67
2002 L -0.30 -0.53
2007 P -0.29 -0.38
2007 L -1.44 -1.71
(1) P=Presidential, L=Legislative
Table 3 Regression model of FN voting in second-order elections (1984-2011)
B s.e. VIF
Constant -8.95 1.57
% vote FN in previous election(1) .36 .08 1.33
FN popularity(2) 1.38 .13 1.04
% time elapsed in first-order cycle .02 .01 1.04
Regional election(3) 1.05 .68 1.50
European election(3) -1.22 .58 1.18
Adj. R2 0.87
1.24
1.31
19
SE
MAE
N
(1) Election of the same ‘type’, excluding all first regional (1986), European (1979) and cantonal (1982)
ballots; all election scores as % of valid vote cast
(2) TNS-SOFRES series, last survey conducted before election day. FN popularity wasn’t measured
prior to the 1984 European election;
(3) Dummy variable.
Table 4 Individual FN vote prediction errors ( ˆ ) and out-of-sample errors
Year Type(1) ˆ Out-of-sample error
1984 E 1.83 2.90
1985 C -1.48 -2.30
1988 C -1.11 -1.92
1989 E -1.75 -2.71
1992 R -.16 -.27
1992 C -.09 -.13
1994 C 1.42 1.73
1994 E -.54 -.71
1998 R 1.17 1.81
1998 C 1.27 1.78
1999 E .19 .31
2001 C -.32 -.51
2004 R -.07 -.10
2004 C -1.09 -1.49
2004 E .56 .69
2008 C -.06 -.10
2009 E -.28 -.38
2010 R -.94 -1.34
2011 C 1.47 2.16
(1) R=Regional, E=European and C=Cantonal
Table 5 Results from the expert judgement survey (November 2011)
Estimated per cent score of Marine Le Pen in the first round of
the 2012 presidential election
Mean 17.06
Std dev. 3.59
Quartiles Q1
Q2
Q3
15
17
18
Minimum
Maximum
10
30
N 56
Figure 1 Compared popularity data: Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen (2007-2011)
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Figure 2 Voting Intention Polls for Marine Le Pen 2012 (All pollsters): January-December 2011
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Figure 3 Compared FN leader popularity ratings in the 2002, 2007 and 2012 presidential elections
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Figure 4 TNS-SOFRES party and leader popularity scores
